The Transhuman Condition
Kip Werking
The University Of Texas At Austin
Homepage: http://www.ece.utexas.edu/~werking
"There is no evil I have to accept because 'there's nothing I can do about it'. There is no abused child, no oppressed peasant, no starving beggar, no crack-addicted infant, no cancer patient, literally no one that I cannot look squarely in the eye. I'm working to save everybody, heal the planet, solve all the problems of the world."
Eliezer Yudkowsky, Singularitarian Principles 1.0
I. INTRODUCTION
This article is my effort to identify the next two anthropocentric beliefs to die. One would not expect Copernicus's defeat of geocentricism and Darwin's defeat of special Creation to be last comforting illusions that science will expose. There is an important difference, however, between the third and fourth anthropocentric conceits that I propose. Whereas the transhumanist community has largely abandoned, to their advantage, the third conceit, I will argue that even transhumanists have ignored the fourth.
The fourth conceit is my effort to show what transhumanism cannot do. In particular, I will show that while transhumanist technologies may remedy part of the human condition, they cannot remedy a remaining part, which I will call the transhuman condition. My article is, in this respect, similar to the critiques by Dreyfus, Searle, and Penrose, which claim to demonstrate what artificial intelligence cannot, even in principle, do. My critique of transhumanism is relevantly different from those, however, because my arguments attempt to undermine, rather than erect, distinctions between human beings and the world.
While preparing this article I considered other possible anthropocentric conceits. One notable possibility, which the transhumanist community has perhaps not abandoned, is the threat that future technologies pose to personal identity. Some have speculated about the eventual emergence of a global brain. We continue to view ourselves as distinct individuals but technology that could potentially merge our minds or bodies might very well demonstrate that this sense of personal identity is, and always was, an illusion. Although this anthropocentric conceit might have philosophical value, I consider the consequences of abandoning personal identity to be so slight that the conceit is relatively trivial. By the time we should ever merge into a global brain, I doubt that we will care whether or not we are or ever were individuals. In contrast, I expect the population to eventually discover and confront the nontrivial consequences of both the anthropocentric conceits that I do propose.
Complete Essay:
http://transhumanism...re/Haldane2004/
Award:
http://www.transhuma...p/WTA/more/258/