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The Implications of the Upheaval in Tunisia
Posted by
Rational Madman
,
22 January 2011
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1,195 views
If I was asked one month ago which government in the Middle East was most likely to succumb to internal forces, Tunisia wouldn't have ranked high on my list, or on the list of any dedicated analyst of the region. With the looming indictments in Lebanon, and because of the potent capacity of aggrieved parties like Hezbollah to retaliate on the street or through stagnating obstruction, I was more disturbed by the potential contours of a clash between a vengeful Hariri, and the alleged perpetrators of his father's assassination. But with the breathtaking speed and decisiveness of events in Tunisia, attention has shifted to a relatively quiet country on the Mediterranean, whose inhabitants have distinguished themselves with their cosmopolitanism, progressivism, and cultural intelligence. Unlike some of the more striking candidates for political change, though, Tunisia wasn't suffering from any obvious signs of systemically threatening decay, and with a liberal trade posture and sound economic policies, seemed to be adapting relatively well to a situation where it found itself without the geopolitical prestige of its towering neighbor Egypt, or the enviable hydrocarbon resources of the OPEC states in the region. However, there was a failure to appreciate the growing ambition and restlessness of a distinctively educated population that was becoming painfully aware of national limitations in an age of information saturation, which among other effects, helped to diminish the stigma of democratic reforms that have most notably been undertaken with varied degrees of success in neighbors such as Turkey, Lebanon, and Iraq. In concert with the onset of inflationary pressures, these factors helped generate a fury that managed to displace a strongman that was popularly thought to be securely entrenched, and consequentially, has brought the governing norm of the region under heavy scrutiny.
With the surprising events of late, the question that has occupied most interested minds is "what does this all mean?" This question was similarly captivating during the wave of revolutionary sentiment that reverberated across the globe in 2005, and shook countries of identities ranging from Ukraine to Kyrgyzstan. But despite the far reaching ambitions of the aspirants during this period, the so-called color revolutions yielded largely disappointing political outcomes, and left many of the remaining reformers with powerful feelings of trepidation and bewilderment. Indeed, because of the disparity in the distribution of power between the governing and governed, the dynamic that prevented a spread of the wildfire in 2005 may once again take hold, as incumbents take measures to retrench themselves against the infectious mood. In vulnerable countries where states have invested greater capital in security services, and have previously weathered political storms that threatened to place their systems in disarray, there is a greater capacity to quell internal forces of upheaval. As exemplified by the police states of Egypt and Algeria, stakeholders in these authoritarian systems have committed a substantial quantity of resources and willpower to sustain their rule in a context of seething militant unrest and enduring questions concerning state legitimacy. In Tunisia, where the qualitative and quantitative strength of its security services left its rulers in a profoundly different security situation, the potential of the recent turmoil to spark revolutionary political change in the region remains somewhat dubious. Rather, most regional despots seem more likely to survive this torrent through a combination of political appeasement, and tightened security policies that seek to pacify the agitated moods of their constituents, and address endemic vulnerabilities of systems that risk precipitating a popular revolt. And because of the popular sentiments of Tunisia's residents, and the continued influence of holdovers from the Ben Ali administration, the emerging government seems unlikely to possess the revolutionary characteristics that distinguished its Arab Nationalist predecessors, or live up to the lofty expectations of some indigenous and foreign reformers. Instead, the more likely trajectory is one that follows the pragmatic political trend of harmonizing modernity with political Islam, and that emulates the example set by the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and the Justice and Development Party of Turkey. Such an outcome would be in accordance with Tunisia's demonstrated appetite for pluralism, and imperatives of domestic and regional politics that provide impetus and constraints to change.
With the surprising events of late, the question that has occupied most interested minds is "what does this all mean?" This question was similarly captivating during the wave of revolutionary sentiment that reverberated across the globe in 2005, and shook countries of identities ranging from Ukraine to Kyrgyzstan. But despite the far reaching ambitions of the aspirants during this period, the so-called color revolutions yielded largely disappointing political outcomes, and left many of the remaining reformers with powerful feelings of trepidation and bewilderment. Indeed, because of the disparity in the distribution of power between the governing and governed, the dynamic that prevented a spread of the wildfire in 2005 may once again take hold, as incumbents take measures to retrench themselves against the infectious mood. In vulnerable countries where states have invested greater capital in security services, and have previously weathered political storms that threatened to place their systems in disarray, there is a greater capacity to quell internal forces of upheaval. As exemplified by the police states of Egypt and Algeria, stakeholders in these authoritarian systems have committed a substantial quantity of resources and willpower to sustain their rule in a context of seething militant unrest and enduring questions concerning state legitimacy. In Tunisia, where the qualitative and quantitative strength of its security services left its rulers in a profoundly different security situation, the potential of the recent turmoil to spark revolutionary political change in the region remains somewhat dubious. Rather, most regional despots seem more likely to survive this torrent through a combination of political appeasement, and tightened security policies that seek to pacify the agitated moods of their constituents, and address endemic vulnerabilities of systems that risk precipitating a popular revolt. And because of the popular sentiments of Tunisia's residents, and the continued influence of holdovers from the Ben Ali administration, the emerging government seems unlikely to possess the revolutionary characteristics that distinguished its Arab Nationalist predecessors, or live up to the lofty expectations of some indigenous and foreign reformers. Instead, the more likely trajectory is one that follows the pragmatic political trend of harmonizing modernity with political Islam, and that emulates the example set by the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and the Justice and Development Party of Turkey. Such an outcome would be in accordance with Tunisia's demonstrated appetite for pluralism, and imperatives of domestic and regional politics that provide impetus and constraints to change.
Namely, I'm wondering for example :
1 ) if those guys are completely "homegrown" or do they have any ties to Egypt's M.Brotherhood or any other foreign identifiable patrons ?
2 ) how do you think Qaddafi might react ? Tighten up or just pretend nothing has happened across the border ? I assume he might be somewhat antsy right now.
I see you're pretty sceptical about the possibility of a full blown bottom - up bulding of a genuine liberal democracy down there. Pitty, not wanting to sound corny, but I was a bit hoping that some beacon of light might be born there for the Middle East out of this events in the longer run.
Maybe something like Lebannon could've been, if only it wasn't such a clusterfuck in the end.
Cheers