70 replies to this topic

[Rational Madman]

The problem is that "civilized justice" doesn't even have access to all evildoers. In this instance he was protected by 2 governments. This is a political problem, and unlike the technical issue, I don't see it being fixed anytime soon. There will always be rogue government, and if there isn't, the whole world is likely ruled by some sort of tyranny.

A government that chooses to protect terrorists is one which the global superpowers will challenge by force in order to subdue it, I agree. It is evident that a humane approach will not exist until all governments are amenable to negotiation. I don't think you have any proof that a rogue government will always exist, as you can't see into the future. I think we'll let time reveal that for us instead.

We can only be humane when we control the situation, and the reality is that there are a lot of situations out of our control. For instance, would this man have chosen to surrender at all, whatever the situation ?

Alas, humanity only extends to the civilized world (to some extent), and outside that the world is indeed Hobbesian. So unless the world chooses or is forced to "civilize", violence is inevitable. This is why even the most peaceful countries have armies.

Osama would not have chosen to surrender, but he wouldn't have had to. The idea is to capture, not kill, criminals. You don't have to use lethal weapons against criminals. You can use weapons which immobilize the victim and get them to a treatment facility.

I think in the future, as information technology continues to link societies and communities, we will see the expansion of the 'civilized' world. Again, we'll have to see what the future holds. The ability to more humanely deal with international criminals is contingent on the cooperation of the global community.

He attended secular schools and university. He could have done anything he wanted, he was not forced into anything.
Your theory of a "rallying point" is rubbish. Making them angrier can only make it easier to flush them out.

He could not have done anything he wanted. Free will is something we think we have, but we really don't. Your behavior and actions are determined by your genes and environment. If you were raised in a Muslim family, and happen to encounter a particularly influential source for extremist ideals without questioning those ideals and their assumptions first, you may well find yourself on the way to becoming just like him. I don't know who or what made him the way he is, but something did. Something over-rode his better judgement and corrupted him. Whether it was his genes, or bad experiences with westerners, there was something that made him the way he was. Once you realize that it really is genes and environment which govern your behavior, you reach the rather uncomfortable conclusion that no one can truly be blamed for a crime. Life is full of these unpleasant truths - I learned that god and Santa do not exist, and that if I die, it's game over forever; it's unfortunate, but the universe doesn't care too much about what we think. Free will was one of those hurdles which I had the most trouble overcoming... it was harder than discontinuing my belief in Santa or god. In fact, I still grapple with it from time to time.

Whether or not Osama's death will serve as a rallying point remains to be seen. His death may motivate his followers to kill more people, and be more careful about how they go about it so as to preserve what is left of their organization. We're playing a speculation game, at this point. Many things could happen with his followers.

My main point is that we shouldn't be celebrating the death of an individual like Osama. He's a human being who fell into circumstances that made him a monster. As much as we'd like to think that the villains choose to become who they are, perhaps to feed on our comfortable feeling of being righteous, it's an illusion. He didn't pick to be born into those circumstances. And every choice he made during his life, was based on some previous experience which told him how to make that choice, and so on ad infinitum back to his very inception. The dude got a bad plate in life - if someone went up to me and shot me, I might be mad at first, but I'd realize that it was his circumstances that led him to shoot me, and I wouldn't be mad in the long run.

Even assuming that human behavior can be reduced genetic and environmental influences----which is highly debatable---there are countless obstacles to systematically shielding humans from their impact. So at least in the short term, a far reaching intervention wouldn't be feasible or viable means for addressing the incidence of violence.

[Rational Madman]

He could not have done anything he wanted. Free will is something we think we have, but we really don't. Your behavior and actions are determined by your genes and environment.

Even if free will is an illusion (which may very well be so) the fact is that we have built a whole civilisation around that illusion, and the alternative to this isn't too enticing, if society followed the determinist perspective to its logical conclusion, it would most probably collapse, so individuals need to be treated as they were not merely puppets driven by outside forces, but actors who can be charged with responsibility for their actions, there simply isn't any other option if we are to thrive.

If it was up to me, I'd lock him up in a remote island until his last breath, but I'm also not morally judgemental of people who lost loved ones in attacks he orchestrated entertaining animal vengeful instincts and rejoicing with his death either.

I understand that in this particular situation it wasn't technically viable to seize him alive, and even with his influence weakened in the last years, his mind was still a formidable danger to innocents thus taking his life was, I think, the defendable thing to do, once the opportunity presented itself. One should not find satisfaction with such state of affairs, but should as well acknowledge that this is how things are in the current reality. It is possible to fight monsters while not becoming one, but rarely is it to do so successfully with hands completely clean.

.....


And Pakistanis have shitloads of explaining to do.

Concerning your last point, I'm assuming you're referring to the location of Bin Laden's compound----35 miles from Islamabad, and just over a mile from the Pakistani Military Academy. Because of this location and the charged emotions that have arisen in the conflict, the first instinct of many has been to assume that this circumstantial evidence is suggestive of a state sanctioned support and shelter of Bin Laden. Or alternatively, as a means of maximizing the allotment of foreign aid. However, there are several facts that suggest otherwise.

First, the Pakistani Military and the ISI have played critical roles in prosecuting the war against Al-Qaeda:
*Which has included the apprehension of high ranking members of the leadership (Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Ramzi Binalshibh, Abu Faraj al-Libi, Omar Saed Sheikh, Ahmed Ghalaini, and yes, Osama Bin Laden).
*Permitted members of the Special Activities Division and various special forces groups to operate relatively freely (in addition to the indigenous paramilitary hit teams that we arm, and the "278 "advisors").
*Have allowed our drones to launch strikes without prior authorization, which has resulted in the deaths of very significant players like Baitullah Meshud, Saad Bin Laden, Abu Laith al-Libi, and Abu Mustafa Yazid---one of the founders of Al-Qaeda.
*Supported our efforts through the launching operations against the very loosely governed provinces of Northwest Pakistan, which inflicted approximately 18,000 casualties, but came at the cost of about 3200 servicemen.
*Have allowed "hot pursuits" to extend from Afghanistan to Pakistan.
*Have offered their airspace for surveillance, and have opened their airbases for the fueling and storage of military aircraft (mostly drones).
*And finally, they've allowed their country to be used for the transport of nearly three quarters of the supplies supporting coalition operations in Afghanistan.

Second, Pakistan has little interest in harboring Al-Qaeda:
*Because they've declared war on the Pakistani state, which has entailed playing a role in multiple assassination attempts against Pervez Musharraf, the successful assassination of Benazir Bhutto---and several other high ranking members of the military and civil government, and a sustained campaign of violence that has led to thousands of civilian deaths and displacements.
*Harboring Al-Qaeda would risk provoking the ire of not only the United States, but important allies like Saudi Arabia, China, and Russia----all of whom have serious issues with Al-Qaeda affiliated movements. The relationship with Saudi Arabia is especially critical, since as of late, they've been providing state purchased oil on credit----the subsidization of which eats a large chunk of the federal budget. And would take issue with a state that provided haven to the patriarch of a network that recently tried to assassinate the third in line to the throne---Prince Nayef---and the likely successor to King Abdullah.

Third, Abbottabad would hardly be an ideal place for shelter:
*The risk of exposing its ostensible duplicity would be too great because of the strategic importance of the city's most important facility---the Pakistani Military Academy.
*The city has insufficient security assets to protect and conceal Bin Laden----an isolated military base, or a city with denser military presence would've been more logical.

Fourth, because Pakistan made the following contributions to Bin Laden's death (although they can't afford to publicly admit the extent of their role):
*Wiretapped his compound, and sent the intelligence to the CIA for further analysis.
*Ordered local forces to stand down, and cordon off the compound from the local population.
*Earlier this year, they apprehended a senior member of the Indonesian group Jemaah Islamiyah---Umar Patek---in the very same city, which is a figure that probably provided decisive pieces of intelligence about Bin Laden's location.
*The office of the Presidency authorized the raid before hand----despite popular accounts that suggest otherwise.

Even with this level of cooperation, though, it's certainly no secret that Pakistan has maintained a frosty relationship with other loathsome groups like Lashkar-I-Taiba, the Afghan Taliban, and the Haqqani Network, but these relationships need to placed in context. First, Pakistan fears the consequences of contagious civil violence that spilling over into Northwest Pakistan, and a recurrence of the crippling refugee crisis that they faced during the Soviet Afghan War. Second, the embarrassingly poor performance of Pakistan in its last four major conflicts with India has greatly intensified the security dilemma between the two rivals, and has rendered Pakistan paranoid about all Indian activities on its periphery---which are feelings sometimes justified. Indeed, India has capitalized on the historical tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to force a diversion of troops posted near the Line of Control, has acted as one of the principal patrons of Afghanistan. To neutralize this threat, and understanding that its influence with traditional members of the Afghan elite is limited, Pakistan has been forced to use groups like the Taliban and the Haqqani Network as proxies for the rule and pacification of Afghanistan. So although Pakistani support for these groups may superficially appear to be indicative of a sympathy for radical Islam, it rather has a basis in its definition of national interests.

However, during the rule of Zia ul-Haq, there was a considerable strengthening of Sharia Law, which was an important component of an extensive campaign to further Islamize Pakistani society. But in addition to the broad Pakistani society, there was an especial emphasis on the Pakistani security services, where many of his like-minded allies were installed in positions of authority, and whom helped him preside over the indoctrination of a new generation of Pakistani officers. This generation identified with the strategic rationalization of support for militant groups, but because of the programmed faith of some of the officers of this new generation, their support also had a basis in an affinity for the defining ideology of the hundreds of militant groups that operated in Pakistan. But after the mysterious death of Zia, there was serious change in trajectory, and sincere attempts were made by his successors to clean up the pervasive mess that he left. Unfortunately, though, they weren't entirely successful in purging the very entrenched allies of Zia. And since their influence remained after the chain of command was broken----meaning some felt less of an obligation to follow the orders of his successors---some of the more zealous began to conduct activities that were unsanctioned by the state, including supporting some of the more radical militant groups and their acts of terrorism.

These divisions within the security services continue to exist, and may have widened because of the impotence of the ruling President, Asif Ali-Zaradari. And although the dividing lines are somewhat opaque, the security services can be appropriately divided into two groups: the more pragmatic nationalists, and the religiously zealous hyper-nationalists. Though a minority, the latter group remains too powerful to systematically purge, and because of Pakistan's tense relations with India, the more pragmatic faction is loath to give India an opportunity to exploit the likely civil conflict that would arise in the event of such a purge. So this faction remains, and the pragmatists do their best to keep them at bay. But it seems evident that this radical faction has become more brazen in its behavior, which became clear after revelations about its suspected role in orchestrating attacks against India's Parliament in 2001, and the recent attack against the residents of Mumbai in 2008. But additionally, I suspect this faction also maintains some ties with Al-Qaeda, and through the provision of support, have played a critical role in frustrating the international campaign against this organization. For example, one of the likely leaders of this faction, former ISI Director Hamid Gul, has been quite open about his sympathy for Al-Qaeda, and from circumstantial evidence, seems to have had a substantive relationship with one of its operational coordinators---Omar Saeed Sheikh, or the abductor of Daniel Pearl. And given the location of Bin Laden's compound and the behavior of this dissident group, I think its reasonable to postulate that its members had sympathizers at the Pakistani Military Academy and other bases in the city, that were sufficient in strength to place Bin Laden at ease. Indeed, Hamid Gul has alluded to the existence of such an arrangement, because after Bin Laden's capture, he suggested that he was effectively in "retirement."

So despite the narrative being conveyed by the increasingly hysterical and pornographic media, the situation in Pakistan is much more complex than what it might superficially seem.

Edited by Rol82, 09 May 2011 - 10:47 PM.

[Rational Madman]

(Although it is interesting that termination was evidently deemed preferable to capture in this case).

Yes, I thought that was due to technical reasons of heavy armed resistance, but now it turns out the actual final stage of the operation had a somewhat grotesque flavor to it:

Panetta said that bin Laden made "some threatening moves that clearly represented a clear threat to our guys. And that's the reason they fired."

Carney filled in details about the assault, saying that bin Laden did resist the commandos, although he was not armed. One of bin Laden's wives, Carney said, was in the room and tried to charge at the U.S. assaulters

.

Supposedly there were also 23 children (age not precised) and 9 women in the compound during the assault.



His trial would be an interesting legal spectacle to watch in itself, had he been taken alive.

Although I was of course not present during White House deliberations, I suspect there were some important rationales for the decision to order the killing---rather than capture---of Bin Laden. First, they've wised from the political nightmare that was created with the bungled attempt to transfer some detainees from Guantanamo Bay, and try them in civilian courts. Because to their dismay, the public mood quickly changed on this issue, and sensing a golden opportunity, the Republicans made an electoral issue out of the decision. But furthermore, I think it suddenly dawned on them that cases supported largely by circumstantial and hearsay evidence, and to some degree, from information extracted through controversial interrogation techniques, would probably not survive the civilian courts in some instances----even though the government has some recourse in the event of a failure to convict detainees in civilian courts. And with the spectacle that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed has made of himself during his legal proceedings, I think the Obama administration decided that granting the patriarch of the movement a forum wouldn't be the wisest move. Second, Bin Laden had expressed a desire---through his driver Salim Hamdan----to commit suicide in the event of his imminent capture. But interestingly, he requested that Hamdan due the deed, since as it clearly appears now, he didn't have the willpower to pull the trigger once the attack commenced. However, there was still a risk of suicide---which all six of the Madrid bombers resorted to when Spanish authorities began their raid, for instance---which if carried out, would've greatly diminished the propaganda value of the operation. Third, I think the military and intelligence services are growing less confident about the utility of interrogation, because as they've found, the subjects are often difficult to break, the amount of false leads greatly exceeds the amount of actionable intelligence, and usually after the capture of an important figure in the movement, Al-Qaeda changes its pattern enough to devalue whatever information the subject might have. Fourth, the grisly nature of his death was probably deliberate, and meant to demonstrate the punitive consequences to any terrorist that might dare to launch an attack similar to or exceeding the magnitude of the attack on September 11th. Such might seem a bit macho, but there is substantial evidence that even terrorists care for their lives.

Given the close quarters nature of the operation, and the unarmed status of Bin Laden, his killing is likely to be an enduring legal controversy, though. But I think as long as the participants of the operation maintain that Bin Laden had a hostile intent---the accounts of the survivors are likely to have a dubious value----the circumstances of his death will probably remain as just an academic controversy.

[Rational Madman]

To add clarity to my thoughts on the matter, I should say that I found it to be distinctly pleasing to learn of the passing of Bin Laden, but I'm afraid to say that our troubles have yet to end. Indeed, although the symbolic importance of Bin Laden is undeniable, by the time of his capture, he was throughly isolated, mysteriously ill, and overall, relatively harmless. And much to his likely dismay, he left an organization that has suffered grave losses in manpower, resources, and operational capacity. And due to these staggering losses, rank and file members found themselves reevaluating the trajectory of Al-Qaeda as an organization, and the tenability of its leadership. Because in spite of their bluster, Bin Laden and his Deputy Emir, Ayman al-Zawahiri, were deeply insecure about their religious and jihadist credentials----which were considered dubious by their community until their audacious bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. These attacks, and the subsequent attacks on September 11th certainly helped bolster their fragile reputations, but among veteran jihadists---especially those of whom they were on close terms with---they never achieved the deity like status that they long yearned for over the years. Because even though their actions inspired thousands to arms, they were still considered by veterans to be ill-fitting as the directors of at transnational movement for scattered parties to coalesce around.

This doubt led to the departure or deaths of founding members, and created a division that persisted even until Al-Qaeda's epochal moment on September 11th. Because when the decision to begin the execution of the attack was reached by the organization's ruling committee, it was not a unanimous decision. Chief among the dissenters were Saif Al-Adel---Deputy Military Commander, Abu Hafs the Mauritanian---Head of the Fatwa Committee, and Sulemein Abu Ghaith---Chief Spokesman. Additionally, important allies such as Norman Benotman---leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, and Mullah Mohammed Omar----the spiritual leader of the Taliban, expressed serious doubts about the endeavor. Although the reasons for their objections were varied, there was a general agreement that such an operation would almost certainly precipitate a devastating response that would jeopardize not only the organizational integrity of Al-Qaeda, but sacrifice the hard fought victories of the Taliban----who had still not established control over the Panjshir Valley, and were already facing heavy international pressure. But being convinced of the supremacy of his wisdom and his destiny as the Emir of a global resistance movement, the attacks defiantly proceeded according to meticulous planning.

As expected, the American invasion came, much of Al-Qaeda's personnel and infrastructure was destroyed, their hosting government was displaced, and most of their membership was forced to flee the country. While the Taliban, Bin Laden, and Zawahiri departed for friendly provinces in Northwestern Pakistan, many of the dissenters embarked on a journey in the opposite direction. The principal members of this group arrived in Iran, where they had cultivated ties with rogue members of the Revolutionary Guard, and with Hezbollah of Iran, which was a connection that had previously turned out to be useful for many of the 9/11 hijacker's trip to the United States. But while they were in Iran, they hoped to direct a parallel movement against a large list of apostates in the region, but learning from the errors of their Emir, this campaign was to be conducted with considerably more pragmatism. However, once their presence became known by the mainstream leadership of Iran, their activities were greatly curtailed, and because Iran's fate was uncertain in the aftermath of the Taliban's fall, it was decided that they were to be used as bargaining chips. But in spite of their restrictions, they were still afforded the freedom to communicate with their comrades, and direct their activities from their places of captivity.

Although the dissenting group led by Saif al-Adel parted ways with the main body of the organization, they did not completely sever their ties, since they were keen to capitalize on the brand name appeal of their organization. And in recognition of the organizational value of Saif al-Adel, he was anointed Head of the Military Committee after a successful drone strike against his predecessor, Mohammed Atef. But nonetheless, his authority was diluted by the creation of two new positions in the hierarchy, Commander of External Operations---which was a position assumed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and Commander of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Theater---which was role that Abu Faraj al-Libi probably filled. Although al-Adel was marginalized by his house arrest and contentious relationship with the leadership, he slowly added to his reputation through the direction of acts of terrorism in the region, the mentoring of jihadists---like Abu Musab Zarqawi, forging alliances, building his organization, and in his prolific writing, the creation of a manifesto that stood palpably at odds with the thoroughly plagiarized texts produced by Zawahiri.

As Iran faced greater international scrutiny over its nuclear weapons program, a decision was made to slowly release the Al-Qaeda captives back into the wild, which culminated with the release of Saif al-Adel and Abu Hafs at some point in 2010. Since their release, it's suspected that they've both returned to improve the leadership deficits of Al-Qaeda's degraded organization. But since their arrival, the fortunes of Al-Qaeda have greatly improved, because it seems that they've managed to secure a formal merger with either disaffected members, or the entire organizations of groups like Lashkar-i-Taiba---whom was behind the Mumbai attacks, Jaish-i-Mohammed, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, and several of the Taliban factions within Pakistan. And while the leadership structure is unclear, it appears that Saif al-Adel, and the new Director of External Operations, Ilyas Kashmiri, are to hold the most prominent roles in the expanded organization. The new organization would constitute a significant upgrade in the operational capacity of Al-Qaeda, because even at the height of its power, it had a membership of only 500 members, and an annual operating budget of about $30 million. And if the merger between the aforementioned militant groups was indeed formalized, its organizational strength would now be in the low thousands, and infused with several new streams of revenue that would exponentially exceed the operating budget that it enjoyed during the height of its power. Because of the many limitations of Bin Laden, I suspect that this coalition was created, and will be held together by al-Adel and Kashmiri. But in contrast to Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda, this new creature will employ a disciplined and low key attritional strategy against near and far enemies. Which means that the new Al-Qaeda will avoid the sort of spectacular operations---like September 11th---that invite an overwhelmingly muscular response, and rather, focus more on small scale, psychologically scarring operations like the 2008 attack on Mumbai. Parallel to these acts of terror, guerilla campaigns will probably be intensified in the most susceptible states like Jordan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Morocco, Lebanon, and the Palestinian Territories, because the creation of an Islamic Emirate has not ceased to be long term objective.

So in sum, the death of Bin Laden does not come close to marking the end of Al-Qaeda, and if anything, spared the organization from a potentially damaging leadership struggle.

Edited by Rol82, 09 May 2011 - 10:38 PM.

[rwac]

Concerning your last point, I'm assuming you're referring to the location of Bin Laden's compound----35 miles from Islamabad, and just over a mile from the Pakistani Military Academy. Because of this location and the charged emotions that have arisen in the conflict, the first instinct of many has been to assume that this circumstantial evidence is suggestive of a state sanctioned support and shelter of Bin Laden. Or alternatively, as a means of maximizing the allotment of foreign aid. However, there are several facts that suggest otherwise.

First, the Pakistani Military and the ISI have played critical roles in prosecuting the war against Al-Qaeda:
*Which has included the apprehension of high ranking members of the leadership (Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Ramzi Binalshibh, Abu Faraj al-Libi, Omar Saed Sheikh, Ahmed Ghalaini, and yes, Osama Bin Laden).
*Permitted members of the Special Activities Division and various special forces groups to operate relatively freely (in addition to the indigenous paramilitary hit teams that we arm, and the "278 "advisors")
*Have allowed our drones to launch strikes without prior authorization, which has resulted in the deaths of very significant players like Baitullah Meshud, Saad Bin Laden, Abu Laith al-Libi, and Abu Mustafa Yazid---one of the founders of Al-Qaeda.
*Supported our efforts through the launching operations against the very loosely governed provinces of Northwest Pakistan, which inflicted approximately 18,000 casualties, but came at the cost of about 3200 servicemen.
*Have allowed "hot pursuits" to extend from Afghanistan to Pakistan.
*Have offered their airspace for surveillance, and have opened their airbases for the fueling and storage of military aircraft (mostly drones).
*And finally, they've allowed their country to be used for the transport of nearly three quarters of the supplies supporting coalition operations in Afghanistan.

Well, I don't know about state sanctioned support, but perhaps a few people high in Pakistani ISI/army/gov knew about OBL.

Third, Abbottabad would hardly be an ideal place for shelter:
*The risk of exposing its ostensible duplicity would be too great because of the strategic importance of the city's most important facility---the Pakistani Military Academy.
*The city has insufficient security assets to protect and conceal Bin Laden----an isolated military base, or a city with denser military presence would've been more logical.

You do realize that those reasons work against each other.
Putting him in an isolated military base would cast even more suspicion as to the complicity of the Pakistanis.
Presumably the Pakistanis did not want more people knowing about OBL which would bring it's own problems, I bet Pakistan, and the military forces in particular are just riddled with spies...

I don't know which way to lean on this. How would this look different if OBL was under house arrest by the ISI ?

http://pajamasmedia....t-the-obl-raid/
http://www.telegraph...i-security.html

Edited by rwac, 08 May 2011 - 02:08 PM.

[Rational Madman]

To add clarity to my thoughts on the matter, I should say that I found it to be distinctly pleasing to learn of the passing of Bin Laden, but I'm afraid to say that our troubles have yet to end. Indeed, although the symbolic importance of Bin Laden is undeniable, by the time of his capture, he was throughly isolated, mysteriously ill, and overall, relatively harmless. And much to his likely dismay, he left an organization that has suffered grave losses in manpower, resources, and operational capacity. And due to these staggering losses, rank and file members found themselves reevaluating the trajectory of Al-Qaeda as an organization, and the tenability of its leadership. Because in spite of their bluster, Bin Laden and his Deputy Emir, Ayman al-Zawahiri, were deeply insecure about their religious and jihadist credentials----which were considered dubious by their community until their audacious bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. These attacks, and the subsequent attacks on September 11th certainly helped bolster their fragile reputations, but among veteran jihadists---especially those of whom they were on close terms with---they never achieved the deity like status that they long yearned for over the years. Because even though their actions inspired thousands to arms, they were still considered by veterans to be ill-fitting as the directors of at transnational movement for scattered parties to coalesce around.

Thisdoubt led to the departure or deaths of founding members, and created a division that persisted even until Al-Qaeda's epochal moment on September 11th. Because when the decision to begin the execution of the attack was reached by the organization's ruling committee, it was not a unanimous decision. Chief among the dissenters were Saif Al-Adel---Deputy Military Commander, Abu Hafs the Mauritanian---Head of the Fatwa Committee, and Sulemein Abu Ghaith---Chief Spokesman. Additionally, important allies such as Norman Benotman---Leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, and Mullah Mohammed Omar----the spiritual leader of the Taliban, expressed serious doubts about the endeavor. Although the reasons for their objections were varied, there was a general agreement that such an operation would almost certainly precipitate a devastating response that would jeopardize not only the organizational integrity of Al-Qaeda, but sacrifice the hard fought victories of the Taliban----who had still not established control over the Panjshir Valley, and were already facing heavy international pressure. But beingconvinced of the supremacy of his wisdom and destiny as the Emir of a global resistance movement, the attacks defiantly proceeded according to meticulous planning.

As expected, the American invasion came, much of Al-Qaeda's personnel and infrastructure was destroyed, their hosting government was displaced, and most of their membership was forced to flee the country. While the Taliban,Bin Laden, and Zawahiri departed for friendly provinces in Northwestern Pakistan, many of the dissenters embarked on a journey in the opposite direction. The principal members of this group arrived in Iran, wherethey had cultivated ties with rogue members of the Revolutionary Guard, andwith Hezbollah of Iran, which was a connection that had previously turned out to be useful for many of the 9/11 hijacker's trip to the United States. But while they were in Iran, they hoped to direct a parallel movement against a large list of apostates in the region, but learning from the errors of their Emir, this campaign was to be conducted with considerably more pragmatism. However, once their presence became known by the mainstream leadership of Iran, their activities were greatly curtailed, and because Iran's fate was uncertain in the aftermath of the Taliban's fall, it was decided that they were to be used as bargaining chips. But in spite of their restrictions, they were still afforded the freedom to communicate with their comrades, and direct their activities from their places of captivity.

Although the dissenting group led by Saif al-Adel parted ways with the main body of the organizations they did not completely sever their ties, since theywere keen to capitalize on the brand name appeal of their organization. And in recognition of the organizational value of Saif al-Adel, he was anointed Head of the Military Committee after a successful drone strike against his predecessor, Mohammed Atef. But nonetheless, his authority was dilutedby the creation of two new positions in the hierarchy, Commander of External Operations---which was a position assumed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and Commander of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Theater---which was role that Abu Faraj al-Libi probably filled. But even though al-Adel was marginalized by hishouse arrest and contentious relationship with the leadership, he slowly added to his reputation through the direction of acts of terrorism in the region, the mentoring of jihadists---like Abu Musab Zarqawi, forging alliances, building his organization, and in his prolific writing, he created a manifesto that palpably stood at odds with the thoroughly plagiarized texts produced by Zawahiri.

As Iran faced greater international scrutiny over its nuclear weapons program, a decision was made to slowly release the Al-Qaeda captives back into the wild, which culminated with the release of Saif al-Adel and Abu Hafs at some point in 2010. Since their release, it's suspected that they've both returned to improve the leadership deficits of the degraded organization. But since their arrival, the fortunes of Al-Qaeda have greatly improved, because it seems that they've managed to secure a formal merger with either disaffected members, or the entire organizations of groups like Lashkar-i-Taiba---whom was behind the Mumbai attacks, Jaish-i-Mohammed, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, and several of the Taliban factions within Pakistan. And while the leadership structure is unclear, it appears that Saif al-Adel, and the new Director of External Operations, Ilyas Kashmiri, are to hold the most prominent roles in the expanded organization. The new organization would constitute a significant upgrade in the operational capacity of Al-Qaeda, because even at the height of its power, it had a membership of only 500 members, and an annual operating budget of about $30 million. And if the merger between the aforementioned militant groups was indeed formalized, its organizational strength would now be in the low thousands, and infused with several new streams of revenue that would exponentially exceed the operating budget that it enjoyed during the height of its power. Because of the many limitations of Bin Laden, I suspect that this coalition was created, and will be held together by al-Adel and Kashmiri. But in contrast to Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda, this new creature will employ a disciplined and low key attritional strategy against near and far enemies. Which means that the new Al-Qaeda will avoid the sort of spectacular operations---like September 11th---that invite an overwhelmingly muscular response, and rather, focus more on small scale, psychologically scarring operations like the 2008 attack on Mumbai. Parallel to these acts of terror, guerilla campaigns will probably be intensified in the most susceptible states like Jordan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Morocco, Lebanon, and the Palestinian Territories, because the creation of an Islamic Emirate has not ceased to be long term objective.

So in sum, the death of Bin Laden does not come close to marking the end of Al-Qaeda, and if anything, spared the organization from a potentially damaging leadership struggle.

Hmm, the spacing gets really screwed up when you copy and paste text from a Word document, but maybe it has something to do with the different font. Anyway, I wrote most of this last week shortly after the topic was started, but because the location of the topic was moved when I tried to post this entry, I lost a lot of the text.

Amendment: Okay, I'm not taking the negative vote personally, but I'm failing to see how this innocuous post could possibly be voted down.

Edited by Rol82, 09 May 2011 - 02:37 AM.

[Rational Madman]

Concerning your last point, I'm assuming you're referring to the location of Bin Laden's compound----35 miles from Islamabad, and just over a mile from the Pakistani Military Academy. Because of this location and the charged emotions that have arisen in the conflict, the first instinct of many has been to assume that this circumstantial evidence is suggestive of a state sanctioned support and shelter of Bin Laden. Or alternatively, as a means of maximizing the allotment of foreign aid. However, there are several facts that suggest otherwise.

First, the Pakistani Military and the ISI have played critical roles in prosecuting the war against Al-Qaeda:
*Which has included the apprehension of high ranking members of the leadership (Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Ramzi Binalshibh, Abu Faraj al-Libi, Omar Saed Sheikh, Ahmed Ghalaini, and yes, Osama Bin Laden).
*Permitted members of the Special Activities Division and various special forces groups to operate relatively freely (in addition to the indigenous paramilitary hit teams that we arm, and the "278 "advisors")
*Have allowed our drones to launch strikes without prior authorization, which has resulted in the deaths of very significant players like Baitullah Meshud, Saad Bin Laden, Abu Laith al-Libi, and Abu Mustafa Yazid---one of the founders of Al-Qaeda.
*Supported our efforts through the launching operations against the very loosely governed provinces of Northwest Pakistan, which inflicted approximately 18,000 casualties, but came at the cost of about 3200 servicemen.
*Have allowed "hot pursuits" to extend from Afghanistan to Pakistan.
*Have offered their airspace for surveillance, and have opened their airbases for the fueling and storage of military aircraft (mostly drones).
*And finally, they've allowed their country to be used for the transport of nearly three quarters of the supplies supporting coalition operations in Afghanistan.

Well, I don't know about state sanctioned support, but perhaps a few people high in Pakistani ISI/army/gov knew about OBL.

Third, Abbottabad would hardly be an ideal place for shelter:
*The risk of exposing its ostensible duplicity would be too great because of the strategic importance of the city's most important facility---the Pakistani Military Academy.
*The city has insufficient security assets to protect and conceal Bin Laden----an isolated military base, or a city with denser military presence would've been more logical.

You do realize that those reasons work against each other.
Putting him in an isolated military base would cast even more suspicion as to the complicity of the Pakistanis.
Presumably the Pakistanis did not want more people knowing about OBL which would bring it's own problems, I bet Pakistan, and the military forces in particular are just riddled with spies...

I don't know which way to lean on this. How would this look different if OBL was under house arrest by the ISI ?

http://pajamasmedia....t-the-obl-raid/
http://www.telegraph...i-security.html

I think its clear that Hamid Gul's faction has some high ranking allies in the security services, but the question is who? The Army Chief of Staff, Ashfaq Kayani, was a Musharraf protege and a former Benazir Bhutto supporter, so he's probably clean. And the current director of the ISI, Ahmed Pasha, was appointed at the insistence of the United States. It's also possible that Gul's allies in the security services divulged Bin Laden's location after Al-Qaeda committed a critical error this January, which was the abduction and murder of Brigadeier General Sultan Amir Tarar---otherwise known as Colonel Imam. Colonel Imam was a legendary veteran of the ISI, and since the 90s, he served as the handler of Mullah Mohammed Omar. Additionally, he probably served as a liaison with Al-Qaeda, and even in his retirement, it seems that he was still acting on the behalf of some elements within the ISI, and retired spooks like Hamid Gul. But when he was executed this January by an organization that acted as front for one of Ilyas Kashmiri's---Al Qaeda's Chief of External Operations---militant groups, I imagine its possible that the protectors of Bin Laden decided to terminate the relationship. Because shortly after Tarar's execution, the ISI found Umar Patek in Abbotabad, and Patek likely gave them just about everything about Bin Laden's location. But interestingly, this also might suggest that there might be an additional faction within the security services even closer to Al-Qaeda.


As for questions I raised about the location of Bin Laden's compound, the reason that I'm suspicious is that there wasn't a heavy military presence---relatively speaking---in the area, and because a compound in the residential district is hardly an ideal location to hide the most wanted man alive. Further, given the importance of the Pakistani Military Academy to Pakistan's society, a discovery of Bin Laden would've been too great of a risk for a frail Pakistan that's dependent on the good will of a number of states. Because in the event of a discovery, the state and the protectors of Bin Laden would be hard pressed to explain his eyebrow raising location. What distinguishes Abbotabad from other cities is the number of retired military officers living in the community----some of whom were probably forced into retirement because of their rogue activities, and whom probably have retained substantial influence over local forces and some of the administrators at the academy. So again, given the location of Bin Laden's compound, it seems more likely that some faction within the security services was providing him a safe haven. If he was otherwise being unofficially protected by the Pakistani state, they would've probably placed him in the military housing of one of several bases---where they could better conceal and protect him---for short durations before being transferred to different safe locations throughout the country. These bases are no-go areas for anyone outside the military, and would be ideal for keeping prying eyes away.

Interestingly, the Afghan National Directorate of Security seems to have been the only agency with the slightest clue about Bin Laden's location, since they've been claiming for years that he was living in a compound somewhere in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province.

Edited by Rol82, 08 May 2011 - 11:38 PM.

[Ark]

"I mourn the loss of thousands of precious lives, but I will not rejoice in the death of one, not even an enemy. Returning hate for hate multiplies hate, adding deeper darkness to a night already devoid of stars. Darkness cannot drive out darkness: only light can do that. Hate cannot drive out hate: only love can do that" — Martin Luther King Jr.

[rwac]

"I mourn the loss of thousands of precious lives, but I will not rejoice in the death of one, not even an enemy. Returning hate for hate multiplies hate, adding deeper darkness to a night already devoid of stars. Darkness cannot drive out darkness: only light can do that. Hate cannot drive out hate: only love can do that" — Martin Luther King Jr.

"I pity the fool who thinks that quote was written by MLK." - Abraham Lincoln

/snark

Just so you know the first sentence isn't part of the quote, the actual MLK quote starts with "Returning hate for hate..."

[niner]

Amendment: Okay, I'm not taking the negative vote personally, but I'm failing to see how this innocuous post could possibly be voted down.

It wasn't me who voted it down, but I know that some people frown on reposting large blocks of text without a significant addition. In essence it's a bandwidth flame, I think. BTW, did you get any sleep today?

[Rational Madman]

Amendment: Okay, I'm not taking the negative vote personally, but I'm failing to see how this innocuous post could possibly be voted down.

It wasn't me who voted it down, but I know that some people frown on reposting large blocks of text without a significant addition. In essence it's a bandwidth flame, I think. BTW, did you get any sleep today?

Oh, okay, that's fine. As for sleeping, I managed to get four hours before brunch with the parents today, so I'm fine. Occasionally I have bouts with insomnia these days, but at least it's not as disruptive as it used to be a few years ago.

Edited by Rol82, 09 May 2011 - 03:24 AM.

[chris w]

No matter the weight of evidence, conspiracy theorists will often cling quite stubbornly to their invariably deluded views, so I don't imagine that much can be done to satiate fringe groups. But assuming that there is some credence to their suspicions, I find it hard to believe that a very image conscious White House would risk the inevitable political consequences of such a massive deception, which given the powerful feelings that Bin Laden's death---and life----elicited, would effectively neutralize any policy achievements that this administration can claim credit, and force a tsunami like wave of resignations that would almost certainly reach the top of the hierarchy. And while the sea side burial may add volume to cries of conspiracy theorists, I believe it served the pragmatic purpose of preventing a creation of a shrine for his sympathizers, and while experts continue to disagree, was still consistent with instructions found in the Quran and denominational hadiths.

Rol, I assure that I am not an Alex Jones type, but it also doesn't seem wise to always, invariably reject a conspiracy theory solely on the grounds that it's a conspiracy theory, when there is a relatively low number of potential factors/actors involved, unlike 9/11, but like this case:

1) A Seals' raid on a particular compound in Pakistan ---> 2) US authorities saying they killed Osama Bin Laden -----> 3) US authorities vouching it really was Osama Bin Laden.

That's pretty much it, a closed cuircuit of confirmations from the same people, this thing almost begs to be turned into a conspiracy theory. They didn't want to release the pictures to the wide public - fair enough. But why at least some non - partisan figure of authority shouldn't have been alowed to see them - Ban Ki Moon, Vivianne Reading or queen of The Netherlands for all I care, they wouldn't have to put the "gruesome" photos on the White House homepage.

It also certainly doesn't help the officials' credibility that the details of the raid were changed (armed/unarmed, wife used as a shield/wife attacking) when supposedly it was watched from the operation room as the very events were unfolding.


The anti - shrine theory doesn't hold up so strongly either - pilgrimages to martyrs' graves are indeed present in Shia Islam, but frowned upon in Sunni, especially the conservative Salafi and Wahabi brands. And as you are aware yourself - many ulems are of the mind that the body was desecrated afterall since the sea burial wasn't absolutely neccessary in this event.

Besides, they could bury him anywhere in an unmarked grave in a remote base like Diego Garcia or somewhere and no one else would have to know about the place, just like nobody knew where exactly Hitler was put to smell the flowers.

Another besides - in the previous years people in the know inside the forces were willing to state that Bin Laden had been dead for a while now -

Dale Watson, "Bin Laden Probably dead", 2002

Robert Baer, "When will Obama Give Up the Bin Laden Ghost Hunt?", 2008

Angelo Codevilla, "Osama bin Elvis" , 2009

And even if an "Osama shrine" was created in the place of his burial - why would that be a bad thing for the US intelligence if they had such a clear location of extremist gatherings they could plant a snitch in?

For a sceptic with a good knowledge of history I'd say you have a great deal of faith in your government in this case. Since there is no corpse and there won't be, general Ockham's Razor says to go with the official narrative, but I don't think you're on grounds to "Scanner moment" me here either , this is not yet the Illuminati-NWO kind of stuff.

Edited by chris w, 09 May 2011 - 11:32 PM.

[Rational Madman]

No matter the weight of evidence, conspiracy theorists will often cling quite stubbornly to their invariably deluded views, so I don't imagine that much can be done to satiate fringe groups. But assuming that there is some credence to their suspicions, I find it hard to believe that a very image conscious White House would risk the inevitable political consequences of such a massive deception, which given the powerful feelings that Bin Laden's death---and life----elicited, would effectively neutralize any policy achievements that this administration can claim credit, and force a tsunami like wave of resignations that would almost certainly reach the top of the hierarchy. And while the sea side burial may add volume to cries of conspiracy theorists, I believe it served the pragmatic purpose of preventing a creation of a shrine for his sympathizers, and while experts continue to disagree, was still consistent with instructions found in the Quran and denominational hadiths.

Rol, I assure that I am not an Alex Jones type, but it also doesn't seem wise to always, invariably reject a conspiracy theory solely on the grounds that it's a conspiracy theory, when there is a relatively low number of potential factors/actors involved, unlike 9/11, but like this case:

1) A Seals' raid on a particular compound in Pakistan ---> 2) US authorities saying they killed Osama Bin Laden -----> 3) US authorities vouching it really was Osama Bin Laden.

That's pretty much it, a closed cuircuit of confirmations from the same people. They didn't want to release the pictures to the general public - fair enough. But why at least some non - partisan figure of authority shouldn't have been alowed to see them - Ban Ki Moon, Vivianne Reading or queen of The Netherlands for all I care, they wouldn't have to put the "gruesome" photos on the White House homepage.

It also certainly doesn't help the officials' credibility that the details of the raid were changed (armed/unarmed, wife used as a shield/wife attacking) when supposedly it was watched from the operation room as the very events were unfolding.


The anti - shrine theory doesn't hold up so strongly either - pilgrimiges to martyrs' graves are indeed present in Shia Islam, but frowned upon in Sunni, especially the conservative Salafi and Wahabi brands. And as you are aware yourself - many ulems are of the mind that the body was desecrated afterall since the sea burial wasn't absolutely neccessary in this event.

Besides, they could bury him anywhere in an unmarked grave in a remote base like Diego Garcia or somewhere and no one else would have to know about the place, just like nobody knew where exactly Hitler was put to smell the flowers.

Another besides - in the previous years people in the know inside the forces were willing to state that Bin Laden had been dead for a while now -

Dale Watson, "Bin Laden Probably dead", 2002

Robert Baer, "When will Obama Give Up the Bin Laden Ghost Hunt?", 2008

Angelo Codevilla, "Osama bin Elvis" , 2009

And even if an "Osama shrine" was created in the place of his burial - why would that be a bad thing for the US intelligence if they had such a clear location of extremist gatherings they could plant a snitch in?

For a sceptic with a good knowledge of history I'd say you have a great deal of faith in your government in this case. Since there is no body and there won't be, perhaps general Ockham's Razor says to go with the official story, but I don't think you're on grounds to "Scanner moment" me here either , this is not yet Illuminati-NWO kind of stuff.

Well first, Bin Laden's death has been confirmed by members of Al-Qaeda in a statement released on a forum frequented by militants----the sort of site which requires vetting, and an invitation. And while that may not be conclusive evidence, I imagine that a more formal statement via online forums, audio recording, or less likely, video recording will be released once they're able to regroup----because we don't know the value of the contents of the hard drives, discs, and flash drives that were seized. Although I don't know the role that other intelligence agencies played in the operation, I imagine that both the MI6 and France's DGSE were consulted, since they have a long history of cooperation with their counterparts in the United States. The relationship with the DGSE has become especially important post 9/11, so much so that the former Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, was negotiating a deal to permit the DGSE to conduct espionage activities within the United States, and thus, bypass restrictions in the charters of foreign intelligence agencies like the CIA. So if the operation was a massive fabrication, I imagine members of either of the aforementioned agencies will notify the public at some point----just like how members of the MI6 divulged embarrassing details about the internal deliberations in the lead up of the Iraq War. But even if the Obama administration took an uncharacteristic suicidal risk, I think it's fairly certain that the secret will be unearthed at some point. This is because we have a vampiric press that lives for controversy, and because too many people within the private and public sector have security clearances (just over 800,000 in the United States alone). And because of these realities, I'm suspicious of ostensible conspiracies, because our system makes it nearly impossible to sustain one.

As for the different accounts of the operation, specifically the matter of Bin Laden being unarmed or armed, I think there are two possible explanations for this discrepancy. First, the press contacted multiple sources for an account of the raid, some of whom heard the story second hand, or decided to make assumptions about details that they weren't aware of due to pressures that everyone was subjected to before and after the raid. An example might be White House spokesman Jay Carney, whom was certainly not present at the operations center, but because of his occupation, was probably consulted by nearly every media publication. Second, it may have been decided that an unarmed death would have a greater propaganda value, because Bin Laden's reputation suffered due to his limited exposure to combat, and an account of an unarmed death would only bolster these doubts about his courage.

The problem with burying Bin Laden in an unmarked grave is that when there's a will----as was the case with Guevara's grave----the grave will be discovered. Second, burying Bin Laden at a military base would also be a non-starter, because they couldn't possibly grant a security clearance to a neutral source to certify that the burial was performed in accordance with Islam. And even assuming that he was buried in a secure location, and a neutral source approved of the burial, that wouldn't protect against the deliberate creation of false stories of the dead body being mutilated or what not. Which seems to be a common occurrence in prayer services being presided over by anti-Western Imams. But really, decisions are never perfect in real time, and there were certainly hundreds of other decisions that needed to be made in timely fashion. And though you're right about the Salafist attitude about martyr's shrines, I think it would be a leap to suggest that most militant Islamists strictly adhere to any school of thought in Islam.

Furthermore, there is a long list of names that have suggested that Bin Laden had long ago perished, and usually these are the same voices that question strategic importance of the war on terrorism in their next sentences. But the authors that you've hyperlinked have a dubious credibility in this regard because one is merely an academic, two of the three have been retired for quite some time, and all three have not been privy to the most recent intelligence. However, I can understand their sentiments, because after Bin Laden was last spotted by a Delta Force team in Tora Bora, the trail ran cold. There are several plausible reasons for this failure to find his whereabouts, though. First, the United States had virtually no assets in Northwest Pakistan after 9/11, and because hospitality is deemed to be one of the highest values of the Pashtun, it was easy for the top echelon of Al-Qaeda to operate in this area. Second, I think it's reasonable to assume that there was a faction within the Pakistani security services that was providing Bin Laden safe haven, and went to great lengths to keep investigators off of his trail. Third, the search was virtually abandoned by the United States in 2005, as evidenced by the disbandment of Bin Laden Issue Station (or Alec Station). Fourth, Bin Laden surrendered operational command to Ayman al-Zawahiri shortly after his escape into Pakistan, which reduced his need for movement, and thus, minimized his chance of detection. Fifth, I think it's likely that there were multiple compounds that Bin Laden used for protection, since such would be consistent with his history, and would have a basis in logic. Sixth, Bin Laden was known to be a terrible hypochondriac, and in spite of his celebration of martyrdom, greatly feared his death. Seventh, he insulated himself from most of Al-Qaeda, trusting only his sons (chiefly Hamza, Khaled, and Mohammed), the deceased Attiyah al-Rahman, the captured Abu Faraj al-Libi, and the courier killed during the raid, Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti. Eighth, he communicated only through written messages, and has not used a cellular device or satellite phone since the cruise missile strike against his home and training camps in 1998. Ninth, his continued existence was frequently confirmed---though in code---in intercepted communications, and affirmed in detainee interrogations. Tenth, video and audio recording released to the public were judged to be authentic by several analysts and software applications---though Al-Sahab digitally edited his background and appearance. So with the aforementioned in mind, I never doubted that Bin Laden continued to live and breath.

Edited by Rol82, 10 May 2011 - 01:57 AM.

[The Immortalist]

Rol82 where did you find the time to write all this? Regardless your intellect is impeccable as always

Edited by The Immortalist, 10 May 2011 - 04:59 PM.

[Rational Madman]

Rol82 where did you find the time to write all this? Regardless your intellect is impeccable as always

I work off site, so I'm afforded the right to make my own schedule and rank my priorities. But this privilege is contingent on meeting the deadlines of assignments that I'm given. So I have my days where I pursue my professional responsibilities like a mad man, and my other days when I excel at wasting time.

[Rational Madman]

I should probably add Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, and of course, Ayman al-Zawahiri to the list of members that Bin Laden likely maintained contact with during his period of hiding. But I would be interested to see more light shined on his method of communication, as well as the command structure, because a great deal of our understanding is based on scattered pieces of evidence that haven't been completely confirmed. And after reexamining some conflicting evidence, I'm less certain about Abu Faraj al-Libi's connection with Bin Laden, since he was careful to distance himself from operational commanders whose communications could be more easily intercepted.

Edited by Rol82, 10 May 2011 - 11:44 PM.

[Rational Madman]

I'm beginning to think that Hamid Gul's faction probably didn't play a role in sheltering Bin Laden, and were rather, somewhat indifferent to his activities. Because this group was more focused on the struggle over Kashmir, and maximizing Pakistani influence in Afghanistan, which was an interest that they decided that only Hezbi-i-Islami, the Afghan Taliban, and the Haqqani Network could best advance---due to the relative size of their networks, and their past roles in Afghan governance. In fact, I'm not even sure that it's fair to call this faction the "Hamid Gul faction," since the eponymous figure of this group has reached an advanced age, and at present, the torch may be carried by a prominent figure in one of the successive generations---perhaps Nadeem Taj. The process of reaching this conclusion was sparked by a reexamination of a crucial event that I discussed In a previous entry, which was the catalyst like importance of the murder of Col. Imam----which I should note, was in addition to the earlier murder and abduction of his comrade, Khalid Khawaja, whose career was strikingly similar to Imam's. The importance of their murders should not be understated, because for a numbers of years, it has been jestingly said that the mere mention of either of these two names could get you anywhere in the restive tribal area. But it's abundantly clear now that the landscape has changed, and the shockwave that their murder generated shook the security establishment to its core. And consequentially, the posture of the Gul faction has changed, which means that at least in regard to Al-Qaeda, a major obstacle to the execution of policy has been removed.

Because of their preferences and operational focus, the Gul faction probably didn't know the exact location of Bin Laden. Nevertheless, if there was a need to convey a message to Al-Qaeda, they had channels and envoys that they could use for this purpose. And because many of these groups were merely disposable pawns, they probably had some idea of which bushes should be shook if Al-Qaeda ceased to serve a useful function. This indefinite knowledge about Bin Laden's location, not to mention their distance with Al-Qaeda, was revealed during the protracted Imam and Khawaja affair----which actually began with their abduction last March. Because during this ordeal, multiple attempts were made through proxies---principally Sirajuddin Haqqani----to secure the release of these highly valued assets, but in spite numerous attempts, their demands were ignored by the perpetrators. While this failure came as a surprise to some analysts, there are three probable causes that aptly explain this seemingly unlikely outcome. First, Al-Qaeda had recently merged with several other militant organizations, which has diminished the Haqqani Network and the Afghan Taliban's influence in Pakistan---whose attention is mostly focused on Afghanistan. Second, the the audaciousness of this act suggests that Al-Qaeda could rely on state protection elsewhere, and thus, felt comfortable with incurring the wrath of Gul's faction. Third, Al-Qaeda sensed that the Gul faction were preparing to betray them, and to set an example for all other actors, decided to send a deafening message. The third cause was perhaps the most critical, because the Gul faction has been becoming increasingly vocal about its displeasure with Al-Qaeda, and Tehrik-i-Taliban in particular, which has since transferred its loyalty to the former. In particular, the unusually public Col. Imam had been unequivocally critical of Tehrik-i-Taliban, and due to its indiscriminate campaign against major population centers in Pakistan, went as far to brand the organization as terrorists----which as one can imagine, is a designation that he used very, very, sparingly. But furthermore, the Gul faction grudgingly accepted the changed conditions in Afghanistan, and through one of their public faces, Col. Imam, they suggested that Mullah Omar was willing to delink himself from Al-Qaeda if he was allowed to return to a position in power in Afghanistan. Similarly, Sirajuddin Haqqani---the son and public face of the organizational patriarch of the Haqqani Network---has made it clear in recent interviews that in spite of their past relationship with Al-Qaeda, the Haqqani organization's goals were separate and at odds with those of Al-Qaeda. So the willingness of the Gul faction to invite retaliation from Al-Qaeda and Tehrik-i-Taliban suggests that they were possibly unaware---or unimpressed----by a competing patron, their organizational changes, and relative strength.

But with the passing of two of their senior members, the Gul faction likely decided to strike back, and began to shake the many bushes in Northwest Pakistan that Bin Laden might be concealed. Because Col. Imam's death was conspicuously followed---in a matter of days---by the arrest of Umar Patek in Abbotabad, whom was probably acting as a liaison to his allied organization in Southeast Asia--which Al-Qaeda offered their training facilities to, and assisted with the planning of their spectacular attacks against tourist destinations in Bali. However, if Bin Laden was being protected by a separate faction, then certainly the widely circulated news about Umar Patek would've provided ample reason for his protectors to urge the abandonment of his compound. This failure might be attributable to incompetence, but rather, I suspect that the ultimate death was decided to be in accordance with his protector's interests. So their change in position was probably the result of negotiations initiated by the Gul faction, which lead to an understanding with whatever group that Bin Laden depended on for protection. And If such a compact was formed, it probably contained the following provisions: a.) That a cease fire be put into immediate effect; b). That Al-Qaeda accept the Taliban's primacy in Afghanistan; c.) The replacement of Bin Laden as Emir of Al-Qaeda. If it was agreed that Bin Laden should be removed from power, then it might be fair to assume that the order to execute Khawaja and Imam was reluctantly carried out by their followers. Indeed, the reluctance of Bin Laden's subordinates might explain the duration of the Col's captivity---which was otherwise justified under the pretext of extracting ransom from the captives' families---which lasted about ten months.

In a previous entry, I illuminated the divisions within Al-Qaeda, which grew wider after Saif al-Adel departed with his dissenters to Iran. But following the abduction of Khawaja and Imam, these disagreements were no longer confined to deliberations among the leadership, because in 2010, Saif al-Adel et. al. began to openly address the supporters and members of Al-Qaeda. Which was an insubordination expressed in the form of books, interviews, messages, and fatwas that outlined an alternative strategy, new rules of conduct for members, and remarkably, culminated with a formal denunciation of the leadership of Al-Qaeda. To the surprise of many, this act of rebellion was met with a stunning silence, which suggests that either the usually autocratic Bin Laden was deeply shaken by this open challenge, or because of the deceitful reassurances of those that the he depended on, had developed a false sense of security. Alternatively, perhaps it was a combination of both explanations, but regardless of Bin Laden's reaction, al-Adel and his band made the journey from Iran to Pakistan, and in the Fall of 2010, effectively took command of the organization.

Admittedly, the most important components of the thesis of this entry are based on logical speculations made in the absence of all of the pieces of the narrative being connected by definitive evidence, but I find it difficult to believe that the timing and significance of the two Colonels' execution, Saif al-Adel defiance, and the final outcome of Bin Laden are not related. Because with the ascension of al-Adel, the two factions have a leader that will remain hostile to the West, deferent to the Afghan Taliban, and not at odds with national interests that both groups have defined. Additionally, in al-Adel, they both have a born leader of enormous intelligence that will operate from the shadows, slowly exhaust the West, and minimize the chances of a response equal to or exceeding that which followed 9/11. But of more substance, the successful targets of the drone campaign in the last year indicates that murder of the Colonels might have triggered the formation of a consensus to eliminate Bin Laden's closest followers. Indeed, the drone strikes are the sharp end of the counterterrorist stick, and the Pakistanis are more than willing to outsource the job with the intelligence that they trade. And in the last year, two of three most important links that Bin Laden had to his organization were victims of Hellfire missiles----his brother in law and chief of staff since 1989, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, and his operational coordinator, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman. Additionally, the timing of their deaths should also be of some interest, because al-Yazid was successfully targeted about one month after Khawaja's execution, and al-Rahman suffered the same outcome one month before the return of al-Adel.

So assuming that I'm correct, just who is leading this separate faction that managed to help Bin Laden evade the world for at least 10 years? As I see it, the leading candidate would be Mahmud Ahmed, whom was the Director of the ISI between the years of 1999 and 2001. With the conservative side of the officer class, Ahmed was held in very high esteem, and during Musharraf's seizure of power in 1999, he played an instrumental role in mollifying the doubts of this wing, whom might have otherwise preferred a continuation of Nawaz Sharif's reign. But because of the illegitimate nature of Musharraf's entry into the Office of the Presidency, and the irreplaceable role of Ahmed in this process, an indebted Musharraf promised to loosen the leash that was around the ISI's neck----which was contingent, though, on an agreement to formally place the organization under the direct authority of an Army that Musharraf remained Chief until 2007. So in between the beginning of Musharraf's reign and Ahmed's dismissal, the ISI deepened its relationships with the Taliban, and countless militant groups within South Asia. One of these groups was Harkat ul-Jihad al-Islami, whose members at the time included Omar Saeed al-Sheikh, and Ilyas Kashmiri, Al-Qaeda's Director of External Operations. At the beginning of the union, Harkat ul-Jihad al-Islami was an independent entity, but maintained operational ties with Al-Qaeda----which among other endeavors, included the planning of the September 11th attacks. Additionally, a relationship of some sort was established with Al-Qaeda proper, but the details of this union remain murky. What is known is that the ISI's relationship with Harkat ul-Jihad al-Islami was more open, and may have been created as a conduit organization in order to maintain distance between a group that had publicly opened hostilities with the United States. And following the capture of Omar Saeed Sheikh---the orchestrator of the abduction and brutal murder of Daniel Pearl---it was discovered that the ISI's Director of Operations in Lahore, Ijaz Shah, was evidently in league with Ahmed, and given the responsibility of handling the Harkat ul-Jihad al-Islami---and by extension, Al-Qaeda---- portfolio. Which was an affiliation that was revealed once the controversy surrounding Daniel Pearl 's death became no longer possible to ignore, and compelled Ahmed to task Shah with convincing Omar to turn himself into his personal custody----during which he was debriefed for one week at Shah's private residence before being surrendered to the proper authorities.

Ahmed probably also had a relationship with Omar---previously I mistakenly attributed this connection to Hamid Gul----but because of the profound implications that it might have on Pakistan's foreign relations, and the unavoidable questions about the source of the intelligence, the principle piece of evidence that is often cited as support remains a matter of considerable controversy. The evidence in question came from a cellular phone conversation intercepted by India's external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), whom was surveilling Omar because of his group's terrorist activities in Kashmir. To their surprise, one of Omar's conversations was determined to be with Ahmed. And in this conversation, Ahmed startlingly instructed Omar to wire transfer $100,000 in funds to Mohammad Atta---the leader of the 9/11 attacks. Nevertheless, the intensity of India's strategic rivalry with Pakistan raised serious doubts about the story's credibility. But in their own defense, they claim they passed this piece---and other pieces---of supporting intelligence to Washington for further analysis, which yielded results that convinced some prominent policymakers---including members of the present administration----of its authenticity. However, critics claim that a seasoned intelligence professional like Ahmed would've been unlikely to use a cellular phone to take part in a conversation of such an incriminating nature, especially with the community's widely held knowledge about celluar phones' vulnerability to interception.

Regardless of the truth to what transpired, Ahmed's history and tenure as ISI Director has helped the question of his complicity to endure, and even if the ISI was left outside the planning of the attacks on 9/11, there was less controversy surrounding his affiliation with organizations linked to Al-Qaeda. Indeed, because it was his personal commitment to these ties that made him a liability for Pakistan after 9/11, when it was offered the stark choice of joining the United State's campaign against Al-Qaeda----and its state sponsor---or as attributed to Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, being "bombed into the Stone Age." For Musharraf, the choice was clear, but because of the initial resistance he faced from security services, he realized some additional house cleaning would also be required if Pakistan's foreign policy was to undergo such a radical transformation. So Ahmed was ultimately forced into an early retirement, but to accompany him, his former ISI colleagues Mohammed Aziz Khan---Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff---and Muhammed Yusuf----the Army's Vice Chief of Staff----were also expelled for their views, history, and the agenda they shared with Ahmed.

It is said that a member of the ISI doesn't cease his occupation, and never changes his organizational loyalty. Confirming this reputation about the ISI's members, giants like Ahmed are believed to continue to exert their influence through the many loyalists that pervade their former agency and other organizations in the security services. But many of the forcibly retired like Ahmed insist that they have indeed moved on, even though their names invariably come up whenever major acts of terrorism are committed in the region. So they apparently cover their tracks well, and take advantage of their opponents' reluctance to fittingly punish them for their crimes. So in consideration of recent events, I think that these men have the sort of power and twisted views that make them the most likely suspects in directing an enterprise that included the sheltering of Bin Laden. Still, their ostensible decision to base him in Abbotabad, though, remains a matter of some debate.

In Abbotabad, the Pakistani Frontier Force would be principally responsible for security in the city, where its headquarters also happens to be located. Other civil security duties are performed by the local constabulary force, but since they at one point made an attempt to root out suspected Al-Qaeda militants, it seems more likely that the Frontier Force is a part of the conspiracy. The Frontier Force consists of paramilitary units commanded by regular army officers, and interestingly, I discovered that the unit----the 20th Frontier Force----responsible for securing the area where Bin Laden's compound was based----which is actually in the town of Kokal, 5km NE of Abbotabad---was first commanded by Anwar ul-Haq, whom is one of the sons of former President Zia ul-Haq. And given Zia's influence over the Pakistani officer corp, this unit has likely attracted officers interested in honoring his legacy. Unfortunately, though, I can't find information about the current commander of this unit, and the orientation of its officers. But at least superficially, the town of Kokal would be an ideal location for Bin Laden's compound.

Of course, the narrative that I've proposed is at odds with the account that has been given by the United States, which gave greater causal weight to the results of detainee interrogations and surveillance technology. Even with this conflict with the story that I've constructed, I dont't doubt that either explanation might have played a significant role in determining Bin Laden's end. But it should be pointed out that the lead that policymakers followed was the most promising of dozens of leads that were given some consideration at some point, and at odds with the assessments of a number of different analysts. In fact, prior to this breakthrough, the general consensus was that Bin Laden moved within a network of safe houses in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. For subscribers to this theory, there was somewhat of a significant emphasis on the region of South Waziristan, where it was thought that he could best rely on the support on the militant groups operating in the region, and the indigenous population. Alternatively, other schools proposed locations like Eastern Afghanistan, Kashmir, Yemen, Iran, the Northwest Frontier Province, or one of several urban centers in Pakistan. So there was still some significant doubts about the likelihood of Bin Laden inhabiting the targeted compound in Kokal. In fact, forecasters determined that the probability of the resident being Bin Laden was between 30 to 40 percent. However, I think the Pakistanis were fairly positive, though, and were only doubted because of their inconsistent track record. Because according to Pakistani accounts given off the record---which can be understandably treated as suspect----the compound had been under surveillance since last year, and that the positive intelligence confirming Bin Laden's residence was passed to their counterparts in the United States. Understanding the potential implications that such a strike might have on other operations in the theater, though, I imagine that the CIA thoroughly searched their collection of intelligence in order to determine if they could produce an assessment that was in agreement with the information Pakistan shared. And when they eventually concluded that their analyses of the compound in Kokal was congruent enough with the claims of the Pakistanis, and that the potential benefits greatly outweighed the likely costs, a final decision was made by policymakers to proceed with operation. However, if the United States declined to carry out the operation, the Pakistanis would have still almost certainly possessed the motivation and capacity to do the deed themselves. Because again, the killing of Bin Laden was in the interest of several factions, but due to their fear of the potential backlash----Bin Laden has a 18 percent favorability rating---from segments that believed Pakistani sovereignty to be absolutely inviolable, or rather, identified with the target, it was probably deemed to be much more preferable to share a portion of the domestic political costs with the United States.

So where does this leave the remaining leadership of Al-Qaeda? Well, I imagine Ayman al-Zawahiri will become leader by default, since it would be supremely stupid to assemble Al-Qaeda's ruling committee to render a decision on this matter----in fact it has been said that much of the senior leadership, including al-Adel, have left the country. But if Al-Zawahiri takes the top position, he's likely to be nothing more than a figurehead to divert attention----which might be the beginning of a new paradigm. And once he inevitably dies, he'll be most assuredly be succeeded by another insecure blowhard----like Abu Yahya al-Libi or Anwar al-Alaki---that derives sick pleasure from sending the outside world "frightening" videos. But the real leadership should probably look like the following:

Emir-Saif al-Adel
Deputy Emir-Abu Hafs "The Mauritanian"
Chief of the Military Committee-Abduallah Ahmed Abdullah
Chief of the Finance Commitee-Abu Fadhl al-Makkee
Chief of the Media/Public Relations Committee-Mustafa Hamid
Chief Theologian-Sulaiman Abu Ghaith
Chief of the Military Commitee-Abduallah Ahmed Abdullah
Chief of External Operations- Ilyas Kashmiri
Chief of Afghan/Pakistani Operations: Abdul Shakoor Turkestani
Chief of North American Operations- Adnan Shukrijumah
Chief of Persian Gulf Operations- Abdullah al-Qarawi (after he assumes control over the troublesome Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula)
Chief of North African Operations- Ali Sayyid Muhammed Mustafa al-Bakri
Chief of Kashmir/Indian Operations- Qari Saifullah Akhtar

Edited by Rol82, 14 May 2011 - 07:06 AM.

[manic_racetam]

Did you pull all that info out of your brain including names and chronological events? That's kind of amazing.

[Rational Madman]

Did you pull all that info out of your brain including names and chronological events? That's kind of amazing.

Well, it depends, because there were some facts and figures within the entry that I was very sure of, and others that required consulting other sources.

[Elus]

Biochemical intervention is a promising avenue, but it would be pretty difficult to inoculate a population of potential terrorists, especially when you consider the dire situations of the states they emanate from. Additionally, several inmates at Guantanamo Bay have been administered psychotropic drugs, which for the most part, have yielded disappointing results. However, I imagine a more intensive therapy may offer more promising outcomes. But before that happens, there has to be sufficient evidence that behavior modification---be it pharmacological or through psychosurgery---can work for such subjects.

I don't have any evidence to back up the notion that we may one day be able to reform criminals. It is more of a vague proposition that is based on our increasing knowledge of neuroscience. Whether or not it can truly work is something only time will reveal.

As for your second point, I share your abhorrence for acts of violence, and would prefer that less costly tools of policy be considered first. But you can't be naive enough to think that a pacifistic posture will greatly reduce the incidence of violence and be without substantial costs. Rather, there are immutable qualities in our nature and with the structure of our international system that will make violence a constant feature of daily living. Which with these realities, presents peace loving individuals with the unpleasant dilemma of either watching a city being ransacked, or intervening on the behalf of the besieged. As this relates to Al-Qaeda, principled pacifism carries the risk of exposing populations to tyrannically regressive rule, unremitting violence, compounding the fragility of the international marketplace, creating an environment where deviant state actors and non-state actors are allowed to behave with impunity, and trivializing the international laws and institutions meant to promote peace and stability. So by punishing Al-Qaeda, the system that we've created for deterring conflict is bolstered, because such a response transmits a signal to other actors that acts of violence will not be a cost-free enterprise, which as a consequence, modifies their behavior in an admittedly difficult to quantify way. But is this system working? Judging by the incidence of interstate and intrastate violence, and the number of attributable deaths as a percentage of the population, I think it would be fair to say yes. Because in consideration of just these two criterions, it has been proposed that we're living in the most peaceful period in recorded history. Of course, this relatively more peaceful state is not owing entirely to military intervention and extended deterrence, but I think there is little ground to devalue it to a marginal variable.

I agree that in some cases, force is necessary to achieve peace. Obama addressed this point in his Nobel peace prize speech. One classic example is WWII. Had we not used force, Hitler would have won.

In this situation, force was necessary. An individual like Osama bin Laden would not have come to justice willingly or quietly. Does this mean we should celebrate his death? I do not believe so. I think rejoicing over anyone's death brings down society as a whole. Why? Because death and killing represents the worst of what we are as a species. From what you wrote, you also agree with this notion.

Further, I think it would be a mistake to reduce the motivations of terrorist organizations monocausally to the ostensible "imperialism"---or whatever one wants to call it---of the West. To be sure, there almost certainly will be a response to his death, but when an organization is deprived of a galvanizing figure like Bin Laden, its operational capacity will probably be degraded----depending on organizational developments---- to a state far less than it would've been if it was left unmolested. And although its a matter of some debate, I think the evidence supports the use of decapitation strategies as being more palatable, and sometimes more effective than some of the more conventional choices---like overwhelming force.

Let's wait and see. I wouldn't be surprised to see explosive retribution, either in the form of more bombings or devastating terrorist assaults on US soil. Only time will tell.

As an additional note, I'd be careful of your use of the word "occupation," because it suggests that a majority of the host population wants us to depart---which is definitely not supported by the polling data---and that we're operating without the sanction of the ruling government, which is also clearly not true. In fact, the Taliban fares quite poorly in surveys---never managing to gain the support of more than 10%---and when given the choice of a Karzai government or a return to Taliban rule, the overwhelming majority of the population supports the former option. The Brookings Institution reports provide a fairly reliable picture of the country's mood, and more often than not, so do the surveys conducted by the BBC. How are they successful then? They subdue populations through force, and capitalize on the failings of governments.

Yes, I see what you mean, and I grant that Taliban are far less popular than the US military.

On a separate note, I would be curious to hear your opinion on the economic viability of fighting terrorism. The US has spent 1.1 trillion on the wars since 2001. Rather than spend this money on advancing science and our own infrastructure, the US has spent it on fighting terrorism abroad. Do you believe this is a wise allocation of resources, and if so, why? Do you think it would have been better to spend 2 trillion on science, healthcare, and education or on fighting terrorism? I would pick the former, as it might indirectly lead to solutions of the latter, and might bolster our own capacity to deal with the latter. Given the US financial situation, spending such vast amounts of money on war and the military is, in my opinion, financially irresponsible.

Just an observation---and not directed at Elus, but I've found self-described pacifists to be quite indifferent to the suffering of populations abroad. Which is more than a bit counterintuitive I suppose, and greatly diminishes their credibility. In my view, those that truly loath warfare are the ones willing to use force sufficient to make the act almost unthinkable.

I don't like to see people die, but at the same time I cannot stand seeing progress stagnate. Developing cheap information technology (to allow the people to act against oppressive forces) and medicine (to save 100K people a day from death) would save far more people than merely fighting terrorism. I think we should reassess our priorities.




EDIT: 1.1 Trillion, not 2 Trillion.

Edited by Elus, 14 May 2011 - 07:05 AM.

[rwac]

On a separate note, I would be curious to hear your opinion on the economic viability of fighting terrorism. The US has spent 1.1 trillion on the wars since 2001. Rather than spend this money on advancing science and our own infrastructure, the US has spent it on fighting terrorism abroad. Do you believe this is a wise allocation of resources, and if so, why? Do you think it would have been better to spend 2 trillion on science, healthcare, and education or on fighting terrorism? I would pick the former, as it might indirectly lead to solutions of the latter, and might bolster our own capacity to deal with the latter. Given the US financial situation, spending such vast amounts of money on war and the military is, in my opinion, financially irresponsible.

Just an observation---and not directed at Elus, but I've found self-described pacifists to be quite indifferent to the suffering of populations abroad. Which is more than a bit counterintuitive I suppose, and greatly diminishes their credibility. In my view, those that truly loath warfare are the ones willing to use force sufficient to make the act almost unthinkable.

I don't like to see people die, but at the same time I cannot stand seeing progress stagnate. Developing cheap information technology (to allow the people to act against oppressive forces) and medicine (to save 100K people a day from death) would save far more people than merely fighting terrorism. I think we should reassess our priorities.

While spending money on things like science, healthcare and education might be "nice", maintaining order is the raison d'etre of government. You cannot simply say that terrorism costs less than 1.1 trillion, so fighting it is not worth the cost. Indeed, terrorism and any lawlessness in general tends to get worse if you ignore it, embolden the enemy and show weakness.

The problem is that terrorism is a religious/cultural issue and not caused by the lack of healthcare/education. Indeed a lot of the terrorists seem to come from privileged backgrounds, and throwing money at it will not solve the problem. The "islamic world" was a much different and more civilized place 40-50 years ago, and has become more fanatical since then.

I even doubt that pouring money into our education system is useful at all, we seem to be spending a lot of money on each child, way more than any other country with meager results. Instead, the entire education system needs to be revamped.

Cheap IT is already here, but there's no guarantee that people will actually revolt to bring a secular government. It appears that most people actually want more religion in their government. See Egypt where the Muslim Brotherhood is leading in the polls.

[Rational Madman]

On a separate note, I would be curious to hear your opinion on the economic viability of fighting terrorism. The US has spent 1.1 trillion on the wars since 2001. Rather than spend this money on advancing science and our own infrastructure, the US has spent it on fighting terrorism abroad. Do you believe this is a wise allocation of resources, and if so, why? Do you think it would have been better to spend 2 trillion on science, healthcare, and education or on fighting terrorism? I would pick the former, as it might indirectly lead to solutions of the latter, and might bolster our own capacity to deal with the latter. Given the US financial situation, spending such vast amounts of money on war and the military is, in my opinion, financially irresponsible.

Just an observation---and not directed at Elus, but I've found self-described pacifists to be quite indifferent to the suffering of populations abroad. Which is more than a bit counterintuitive I suppose, and greatly diminishes their credibility. In my view, those that truly loath warfare are the ones willing to use force sufficient to make the act almost unthinkable.

I don't like to see people die, but at the same time I cannot stand seeing progress stagnate. Developing cheap information technology (to allow the people to act against oppressive forces) and medicine (to save 100K people a day from death) would save far more people than merely fighting terrorism. I think we should reassess our priorities.

While spending money on things like science, healthcare and education might be "nice", maintaining order is the raison d'etre of government. You cannot simply say that terrorism costs less than 1.1 trillion, so fighting it is not worth the cost. Indeed, terrorism and any lawlessness in general tends to get worse if you ignore it, embolden the enemy and show weakness.

The problem is that terrorism is a religious/cultural issue and not caused by the lack of healthcare/education. Indeed a lot of the terrorists seem to come from privileged backgrounds, and throwing money at it will not solve the problem. The "islamic world" was a much different and more civilized place 40-50 years ago, and has become more fanatical since then.

I even doubt that pouring money into our education system is useful at all, we seem to be spending a lot of money on each child, way more than any other country with meager results. Instead, the entire education system needs to be revamped.

Cheap IT is already here, but there's no guarantee that people will actually revolt to bring a secular government. It appears that most people actually want more religion in their government. See Egypt where the Muslim Brotherhood is leading in the polls.

At a later time, I'll expound on my thoughts about the comments of Elus and rwac, since they're both well thought, and because I'm not in complete agreement with the content of both of their entries. But first, the 1.2 trillion price tag for the war on terrorism needs to be put into the context of the total appropriations of the last decade, the costs of the September 11th attacks, and its indirect costs----not to mention the costs of catastrophic events that security spending is intended to avert. Since the fiscal year of 2001, approximately 31.5 trillion has been appropriated for federal spending, which was sourced from federal revenues derived from an aggregate output of approximately 125 trillion. So the funds appropriated for waging the war on terror constitutes about 1/26 of total federal spending, and 1/104 of aggregate output. Of course, there are ancillary costs that need to be accounted for, such as the increased war related DOD appropriations, the possible opportunity costs incurred through allocating federal revenues for security purposes, and the possible economic costs. The quantity of potential losses has been investigated exhaustively, but after the recent capture of Bin Laden, for instance, the staff writers at the Atlantic Magazine placed the approximate cost at about 3 trillion dollars----which amounts to less than 1/40 of added output. But should we treat both the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as being a part of the war on terrorism? In my opinion, the war in Iraq had a distinct set of goals, and when its direct appropriations are removed from the total amount of direct appropriations for both conflicts, the figure is reduced to just over 400 billion. And with Iraq removed from the equation, a crude modification of the cost calculated by the Atlantic Magazine might be closer to 1 trillion.

It's difficult to quantify the economic effects of September 11th, because the attacks were preceded by a bubble burst in equity markets, credit tightening, a deteriorating labor market, and a recession that began in March of that year. In consideration of these other variables, estimates of the direct economic costs of the attacks on September 11th are usually around about 0.5% of GDP, or about half of the output lost in a recession that persisted until late November of that year. But the indirect costs were quite significant, because the level of capital investment sharply shrunk to its lowest point in over a decade, retail spending plummeted to lows seen in the last recession of the early 90s, and consumer confidence was reduced to a level not seen since 1996. Furthermore, the deflationary pressures of the recession compounded the high levels of median debt---both corporate and household. This effect was more acutely felt in Japan, which was a country trying in vain to pull itself out of a lost decade that it has arguably never recovered from, and with recent events, it will be hard pressed to return to the level it attained before the onset of the Persian Gulf War triggered recession in the early 90s. These combined effects likely contributed to a reduction in the average rate of annual output growth for the years that preceded the financial market precipitated recession that followed the years between the last recession, when compared to the rate of output growth during the non-recession years of the previous decade. During these years, the average rate of growth was 3%, compared to the average rate of growth of 3.8% between the years of 1992 and 2000.

But what are the effects of conflicts in regions in which price levels are sensitive to, like the Middle East? Because this is a region that produces about 37% of a commodity---oil---that can have a profound effect on all three major price indexes, and the level of aggregate output. Indeed, the spikes in oil pries provoked by the outbreak of regional conflicts----1973, 1979, 1980, and 1990----led to recessions causing an 8.5% loss in output. The extent of these losses were abated to some degree by monetary policy, fiscal stimulus, statecraft, and military intervention, but it's impossible to quantify the potential losses of non-intervention. And over the last two decades, the effect of regional conflicts has been exponentiated by rises in global demand, and the growth of the energy futures market----which are effects that have been hardly mitigated by investments in alternative sources of energy, new discoveries, or investments in the production and refining of oil. So in the present climate, deterring the onset of conflict in the region would be insufficient, but with current price levels, necessary for maximizing the growth of output. This is because a $10 increase in oil prices in correlated with a 0.2% to 0.4% drop in GDP, which means that a $100 increase in oil prices could result in quarterly losses in output that ranges between 300 and 600 billion.

Conflicts in the century in a half preceding the resolution of the Second World War have been generally considered to be more frequent, violent, and with much less of a legal basis. But additionally, the nature of these conflicts may have been also exacerbated by the isolationist posture of one of the international system's largest powers, the United States. Although correlation does not equal causation, this century and a half was also marked by recessions of greater intensity. For example, before the Depression Era introduction of GDP as the principal measure of economic performance, business activity, and trade and industrial activity were used as the primary economic indicators. And during the pre-Great Depression period, there were thirty one recessions, and of these thirty one, five were characterized by a decline of at least 30% in both measures of performance. Of course, not all of these recessions were sparked by the nature and frequency of conflicts, and a closer examination will have to determine the effect that the conflicts of this period had on price levels, output, the volume of trade, and the movement of financial capital. But since the beginning of a meaningful integration of global economies coincided with the spread of industrial revolutions, I doubt that the impact of external conflict was only marginal. So at least superficially, it appears that Post-Second World War changes in statecraft, warfare, and distribution of power---the creation of a hegemonic United States----may have influenced the nature and incidence of conflict.

Edited by Rol82, 15 May 2011 - 02:26 AM.

[Rational Madman]

I posted this entry on another forum yesterday, so I thought I might re-post it in this thread:
Following Bin Laden's death, it's interesting that the targets of the two most prominent retaiatory attacks have been the Pakistani Navy, and the Frontier Constabulary Force. As I noted earlier, the Pakistani Constabulary Force had attempted to combat Al-Qaeda forces in the area, and last year, arrested an unknown quantity named Abdullah al-Masri, whom may have been of some value in Operation Neptune Spear. It's possible that this posture was influenced by the recent appointment of Akbar Hoti, who previously served as a high ranking administrator at the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), which is the Pakistani equivalent of the FBI. While not perfect, the FIA is considerably less tainted than its competitor, the ISI, but more importantly, its senior leadership has been closely aligned with the Pakistani People's Party (PPP)----the party of the ruling President, Asif Ali Zardari. In contrast to the ISI, which is formally under the command of the Army, the FIA is under the authority of the Interior Ministry, which is presently directed by Rehman Malik----a long standing loyalist and advisor to both the President, and his departed wife, Benazir Bhutto.

The Pakistani Navy is also noted for its affiliation to the Pakistani's People's Party, which is owing in part to its concentration in the Sindh province---a party stronghold----and its current Chief of Staff, Noman Bashir, who's the brother of the current Foreign Minister----Salman Bashir. So the targeting of both organizations were unlikely random choices, but rather, a deliberate attempt to change the behavior of actors aligned with the PPP, and possibly, punish organizations critical to the operation against Bin Laden. If this is true, though, then what was the role of the Pakistani Navy? Well, accounts in the Western press have varied wildly at times, with the New York Times reporting the raiding party size at 79, with CNN suggesting that Pakistani soldiers----probably the Special Service Group---taking part in the raid on the compound, and with the National Journal reporting that the ground force insertion was preceded by strafes from helicopter gun ships. But the highly connected Marc Ambinder reported that the launching base was in Tarbela Ghazi, which means that the raiding party was either transported there from an air base in Jalalabad, or by the Pakistani Navy from a US ship in the Arabian Sea.

Before the operation was authorized, members of Seal Team 6 underwent training at Bagram Air Base, and reports indicate that the raiding party was transported by six helicopters: two modified UH-60s, two regular UH-60s, and two Chinooks---alternatively, there might have been four helicopters. The modified UH-60s had a stealth capability, which suggests one of two things: that the lead team was launched from Jalalabad Air Base, or in order to prevent Bin Laden from being alerted, were launched from the Tarbela Ghazi Air Base before the other supporting aircraft arrived on the scene. But since it was reported that the target was softened first, I suspect that the the two teams leading the raid departed from Jalalabad. Due to the possibility of four other helicopters participated in the operation, and because two of the four are used largely for transport purposes, it's likely that a large number of personnel participated in the operation. If fully loaded, UH-60s can transport twelve armed soldiers, but Seal Teams usually have between 4 to 6 platoons, with about 18 soldiers in each platoon. However, information about Seal Team Six remains classified, so its size and structure are unknown. Nonetheless, I still think it's likely that its size and structure is similar to the other teams, but perhaps it has platoons sized to fit into a single UH-60. Moreover, reports of an airstrike suggests that the other two UH-60s were equipped to act as gunships, while the other two Chinooks probably carried a mixture of ground support troops and Special Activities Division members. Chinooks can carry a maximum of 50 troops, so one was likely carrying the other four Seal platoons, and the second Chinook might have been carrying members of the Special Activities Division. Because some of the special forces and CIA personnel allowed to operate in Pakistan are closely monitored, I suspect that the occupants of the other helicopters were inserted secretly so that the operation wouldn't be compromised, and this is where the Pakistani Navy comes into the game.

Ever since the devastating floods of last year, the Pakistani Navy has played a role in coordinating and transporting supplies and personnel from ships docked at Pakistani ports, and US ships based in the Arabian Sea----which keep their distance in some cases for fears of terrorist attacks. In consideration of the organizational loyalty of the Navy, though, it could've been tasked to transport the support personnel under the guise of performing these duties without arousing suspicion. But furthermore, because the Northwest Frontier Province was hit especially hard by the monsoon, it also wouldn't be unusual if the Pakistani Navy was reported to be transporting support personnel to Tarbela Ghazi, which also happens to be one of the hub bases used for humanitarian relief in the province. Finally, the Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Force arrived in the theater two months ago, under the pretext of combatting Somalian pirate bases scattered throughout the Arabian Sea. And among other capabilities, this carrier strike force usually has a Seal Team prepared for special missions, so it might have been involved in the operation.

To add some clarity, here is a possible sequence of the events in the operation:


1. Sometime earlier this year, the two platoons of Seal Team Six assigned to leading the raid are deployed to Bagram Air Base, where they undergo training for the operation.
2. The four other Seal platoons and the CIA operators are transported by the Pakistani Navy---and maybe the Air Force, too----for the ostensible purpose of aiding the flood relief efforts in the Province.
3. While at the Tarbela Ghazi Air Base, members of the CIA and Seal Team 6 prepare for their roles in the operation.
4. The target is positively identified, and the governments in both Pakistan and the United States give the green light to the operation.
5. In Kokal, members of the Pakistani Constabulary Force set up road blocks at major at streets leading to the compound, and instruct neighboring residents to remain in their homes.
6. From the Jalalabad Air Base, the lead teams are deployed so that they arrive at a time that shortly follows the initial attacks of the UH-60 gun ships.
7. The Black Hawk gun ships are dispatched to clear the compound grounds of combatants, and are trailed by the two Chinooks.
8. After the air strikes neutralizes whatever targets were outside the house, one of the Chinooks unloads the other four Seal platoons in order to provide ground support to the leading teams.
9. The leading teams are inserted into the compound's perimeter----one on the compound ground, and the other on the roof---but one of the UH-60s encounters difficulties with its tail rotor, and is forced to perform a controlled crash near the target house.
10. The ground support elements proceed into the compound, providing cover fire for the lead teams.
11. One of the lead teams clears the first floor of its three combatants, and prepares to proceed to the primary target on the third floor.
12. After attempting to arm himself with one of two weapons stored in his bedroom, the primary target is killed by the second team inserted at the roof of the house.
13. With the compound cleared of hostiles, the other Chinook unloads the members of the Special Activities Division, whom are tasked with scrubbing the site of intelligence.
14. Meanwhile, the Seals set up a perimeter around the house, and attend to the the civilians in the compound.
15. The contents of the crashed helicopter are destroyed.
16. After the house is scrubbed of intelligence, the ground forces are extracted---the platoon from the crashed UH-60 are loaded into either the two other gun ships or the Chinooks.
17. Once the US forces are safely extracted, members of the Special Service Group arrive to secure the compound and its survivors.

But if Pakistan's role was substantially larger than what has been largely reported, then why have both states given different accounts? The answer is the image of both countries, and domestic political costs, which would both be adversely affected if an accurate account of the operation was officially given. Additionally, this would explain the apparent strategy of the Pakistani state, which has been to feign indignant ignorance publicly, and admit participation privately. Pakistan's use of this strategy was confirmed in a television interview with Major General Mahmud Durrani, the former National Security Advisor to the sitting Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, whom remains connected with decision makers.

Anyway, if I'm correct, I suspect that there will be further retaliations against the Navy and the Frontier Constabulary Force. But the Air Force, the Army, PPP members, the Special Service Group, and the Baloch Frontier Force could be also be targeted for suspicions of complicity.

Edited by Rol82, 15 May 2011 - 07:53 PM.

[Rational Madman]

If you're not a regular reader of the National Interest, then you're missing out on some of the exceptional commentary that can be be either found in the journal they publish, or their regularly updated website. One piece that stands out is Christine Fair's essay on Pakistan, which is one of the few post-Bin Laden analyses that reads like it was written by an actual adult----a state of affairs that will certainly change once the hysteria dissipates. Anyway, I'll leave the content of her article for the discovery of interested readers, but with the exception of one juicy revelation. which is that since last August, the CIA was surveilling the compound from a safe house that they constructed. But does this mean----as she claims---that the hands of Pakistan's security services were clean after all? I would say that such a conclusion would be premature, and given what is known already, exceedingly unlikely. As I stated earlier, 2010 was a decisive year in the hunt for Bin Laden, because it seems that during this year, a consensus was reached with nearly all factions within the security services. The abduction of the two Colonels was very likely the catalyst for forming this consensus, but there was also another event that I overlooked, which was the Benazir Bhutto investigation launched at the behest of Zardari. To be sure, though, the investigation may have been partially politically motivated, since an indictment was issued to Musharraf----whom to the irritation of many, has decided that he wants to remain a serious political contender. But nonetheless, this sort of probe may have startled a few of the generals into action, because they might have concluded that an investigation of the mysterious death of Bhutto could've been the beginning of a cascade of damaging inquiries into their extracurricular activities. Much of this is speculative, though, which given the paucity of evidence, the endemic conditions in Pakistan, and the state of bilateral relations, is a practice that Fair harshly condemns. But in consideration of the implications of state collusion and the lack of transparency in Pakistan, do we really have any other choice but to speculate about the narrative? In any case, if the CIA did have a station in Abbotabad, I find it difficult to believe that he wasn't spotted earlier, since he was known by local residents to attend prayer services at the one of Kokal's mosque, and on occasion, would pay his respects at funerals. Which leads me to believe that there were other compounds scattered throughout Pakistan, and that he arrived in Abbotabad only recently.

Edited by Rol82, 16 May 2011 - 05:50 PM.

[Rational Madman]

Hmm, a Saudi "diplomat" from the consulate in Karachi was murdered execution style, in what appears to be a professional slaying.... I commented earlier about the closeness between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, which is a relationship that was forged during Soviet-Afghan War, when the Saudi elite and its intelligence agency, al -Mukhabarat, showered the ISI with cash. And although their bilateral relationship has faced some bumps in the road, the Saudis can usually be relied upon to come to Pakistan's aid----loans, investment, diplomatic protection, and foreign aid-----and in return, the Pakistanis have provided security assistance----but the details of this part of the arrangement remains murky. It's widely known that the Pakistani military plays a role in training the Saudi Armed Forces, but it's also whispered that there's an agreement to come to Saudi Arabia's aid in the event of an attack, that some members of the Royal Family are protected by members of the Special Service Group, and most controversially, that Pakistan has transferred some form of nuclear hardware to Saudi Arabia. But the relationship between their intelligence agencies is of more consequence in this context, because one of the principal aims of this partnership was the pacification of Afghanistan through their mutual support of the Taliban. But since this has ceased to be an objective of sharedl interest, and because of Al-Qaeda's insurrection against the Saudi Kingdom, al-Mukabarat has since moved closer to its counterparts in Jordan, Egypt, and the United States. However, this drift apart may have not been well received by some members in the security services, and planted the seeds to what might now result in a serious interagency conflict.

With the recent targeting of the Navy, the Pakistani Frontier Constabulary Force, and now a representative of Saudi Arabia, I suspect we're witnessing the continuation of a pattern of retaliations from militant groups and whatever faction was in league with Al-Qaeda. And if collaboration was the reason for targeting the other two organizations, then there's a possibility that either the al-Mukhabarat played a role in the death of Bin Laden, or they're at least suspected of playing a role in his demise. Which may come as a surprise to many, because although al-Mukhabarat had somewhat of a vague relationship with Al-Qaeda, whatever contact they had with the organization is thought to have been severed after Bin Laden refused Prince Turki al-Faisal's peace offering in the mid-90s. From that point, and until the intensification of Al-Qaeda's campaign against the kingdom, hostilities were minimized because of the boiling unrest that a decade of low oil prices was creating. But with Al-Qaeda's opening of a new front in Saudi Arabia, the kingdom found itself in relatively strengthened position, and determined to respond with a brutal crackdown that resulted in thousands of arrests---and deaths, the neutralization of its donor network in the Persian Gulf, and the regional branch's relocation to Yemen. This campaign extended beyond the kingdom, and into the Afghanistan/Pakistan theater, where it has played a silent role in supporting the concerted struggle against Al-Qaeda and its satellites. In Pakistan, its agents have developed a network of informants for the targeting and apprehension of Al-Qaeda members, but due to the obvious domestic political costs that they would have to incur, the degree of al-Mukhabarat's contributions hasn't been allowed to become a matter for public consumption.

While the Saudi Arabian national killed was officially a diplomat, I think it's more likely that he was a member of al-Mukhabarat, and because a large number of militant groups have found comfort in Karachi, he might have played a critical role----special agent in charge---- in whatever game the Saudis were playing. But the professional nature of the job isn't consistent with the methodologies employed by terrorist groups----whom prefer public executions, or the use of explosives. Rather, the style of Kahtani's murder is more characteristic of the the ISI or the Intelligence Bureau, whom might have somehow discovered the identities of our collaborators, and resolved to systematically eliminate them.

Edited by Rol82, 16 May 2011 - 10:04 PM.

[Rational Madman]

Corrections
The killing of Hussain Kahtani wasn't an execution style slaying as I initially thought, which was an impression I received due to the somewhat vague reporting that I first read. However, it was clearly a professional assassination, since he was ambushed at an intersection by two men on motorcycles while he was on his way to work---the first gunman missed, but the second shooter managed to kill the target with a headshot. It appears that Kahtani was in charge of security for the consulate, but again, I doubt his responsibilities were strictly limited to protecting the consulate and its personnel. On a separate note, I discovered that I was quite wrong about the negotiations between the former Director of National Intelligence Denis Blair and the DGSE. Contrary to what I mistakenly thought, though, both agencies were negotiating an intelligence sharing treaty that would put an end to espionage activities in each other's country: so France would cease spying inside the United Staes, and vice versa.

Edited by Rol82, 17 May 2011 - 06:52 PM.

[The Immortalist]

Does any of this actually matter? I couldn't care less if OBL was dead or not. He hasn't effected my life at all. My life hasn't changed one bit since the towers went down and it also hasn't changed when OBL died. He deserved to die but it's not significant to my life whatsoever.

Call me shortsighted or blissfully ignorant or whatever but I honestly don't care.

[Rational Madman]

Does any of this actually matter? I couldn't care less if OBL was dead or not. He hasn't effected my life at all. My life hasn't changed one bit since the towers went down and it also hasn't changed when OBL died. He deserved to die but it's not significant to my life whatsoever.

Call me shortsighted or blissfully ignorant or whatever but I honestly don't care.

Okay, but I think it should seem clear that my composition has little to do with discussion, since the demographics and traffic of this forum wouldn't be ideal for that purpose. Rather, I'm writing for self-serving purposes, because I'm genuinely intrigued with the yet to be elucidated death of Bin Laden, and writing helps to make sense of everything. So the lack of interest in this thread has an advantage, because it's less consuming, and occasionally I might be reminded that I'm on the wrong avenue.

[cathological]

Pics or it didn't happen.

[Rational Madman]

Well it's official, Saif al-Adel is the new Emir, but I expect there'll be a bit of infighting until he consolidates his position. And it appears that not only was Ilyas Kashmiri snubbed by the Shura Council, but deprived of his post as external operations chief. So he may part ways with the organization, and start a more violent faction---but I doubt he'll survive for much longer.

Edited by Rol82, 18 May 2011 - 08:27 PM.